Electronic Footprints in the Sand: Technologies for Assisting Domestic Violence Survivors by Arief B
 Newcastle University ePrints 
 
Emms M, Arief B, van Moorsel A. Electronic Footprints in the Sand: 
Technologies for Assisting Domestic Violence Survivors. In: Bart Preneel and 
Demosthenes Ikonomou, ed. Privacy Technologies and Policy. Berlin: Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg, 2014, pp.203-214. 
 
Copyright: 
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54069-1_13 
Further information on publisher website: http://www.springer.com/ 
Date deposited:  24th September 2014 
Version of chapter: Accepted 
 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License 
 ePrints – Newcastle University ePrints 
http://eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Electronic Footprints in the Sand 
Technologies for Assisting Domestic Violence Survivors 
Martin Emms, Budi Arief, and Aad van Moorsel 
School of Computing Science, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, UK 
{martin.emms,budi.arief,aad.vanmoorsel}@newcastle.ac.uk 
Abstract. With the rapid growth and spread of Internet-based social support 
systems, the impact that these systems can make to society – be it good or bad – 
has become more significant and can make a real difference to people’s lives. 
As such, various aspects of these systems need to be carefully investigated and 
analysed, including their security/privacy issues. In this paper, we present our 
work in designing and implementing various technological features that can be 
used to assist domestic violence survivors in obtaining help without leaving 
traces which might lead to further violence from their abuser. This case study 
serves as the core of our paper, in which we outline our approach, various de-
sign considerations – including difficulties in keeping browsing history private, 
our currently implemented solutions (single use URL, targeted history sanitita-
tion agent, and secret graphical gateway), as well as novel ideas for future work 
(including location-based service advertising and deployment in the wild). 
Keywords: Privacy; confidentiality; practical security; browsing history; social 
inclusion; survivors; domestic violence; intimate partner cyber stalking; support 
groups; system implementation; work in progress. 
1 Introduction 
As more and more people are embracing online social networking applications, vari-
ous concerns have been raised with regard to the security and privacy issues associ-
ated with such applications. There have been documented cases and reports regarding 
violations of user privacy by some of the big companies providing these services (e.g. 
[18] and [19]), although in most cases, their users seem to be rather oblivious to the 
threats of supplying their details online without much consideration. It is often stated 
that human players are usually the weakest link when it comes to computer security 
[4][9][12], so it is very important to provide a system that requires minimum effort 
from its users. 
When it comes to the consequences of privacy violation, a very poignant example 
can be drawn from our experience in designing and implementing a system to assist 
survivors of domestic violence – the term “survivors” is used rather than “victims”, as 
it more accurately describes the individuals who have lived with domestic abuse [17]. 
 There are a number of published works which highlight the issues of domestic 
abuse and that there is a clear link with intimate partner cyber stalking 
[6][10][13][14]. There are two aspects to the issue: first, an intimate partner (ex or 
current) has a greater level of access to and knowledge about the habits of the survi-
vor; second, the cyber stalking is a new and powerful weapon which adds to the ways 
in which the survivor can be controlled and/or coerced. These works also highlight 
that the survivors who are being stalked by their partner or ex-partners are of a greatly 
increased risk of being harmed [10], and that stalking behaviour (whether conducted 
in cyber space or not) could be viewed as a warning sign of an escalation towards 
violence. For example, evidence compiled by the US Department of Justice suggests 
that 81% of women who were stalked by partners were also assaulted by the same 
partner [16], while the Metropolitan Police found that 40% of domestic violence mur-
ders in London were also victims of stalking [11]. 
Previous studies [3][13] identify that telephones and mobile phones are the most 
commonly used technology in cases of cyber stalking. Statistics published by the US 
Department of Justice [3] also show that among 2.4 million victims of cyber stalking 
in the US, 30.3% of which were stalked by a current or ex-partner, which equates to 
around 730,000 cases of cyber stalking during 2008. Equally alarmingly, the same 
report also provides details of the high-tech methods used to monitor the activities of 
victims, including spyware, video and webcams, listening devices and GPS. In the 
UK, a survey carried out by the University of Bedfordshire [7] showed that 31.6% of 
stalkers were either ex-boyfriends (21.2%) or ex-partners (10.4%). Moreover, a report 
published by the Network for Surviving Stalking and Women’s Aid Federation of 
England [10] details a number of different examples of women being stalked through 
Facebook, eBay, geotagging, and – most worrying of all – through applications previ-
ously loaded onto their smart phone by their abuser which tracks the victims location 
without their knowledge. However, digital technologies and electronic footprints can 
also be used to record the actions of abusers, the evidence of which can be used as 
evidence against them (although this is quite difficult) [15]. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
As we go about our daily lives we are unwittingly leaving electronic footprints, which 
can easily be followed to see what we have been up to.  This is because the technolo-
gies we use in our everyday lives (such as Internet browsers, mobile 
phones/smartphones, land lines, and GPS units) maintain records of our activities, 
which for most of us serve as a convenient aide-mémoire so that we do not have to 
remember “the number of someone who called yesterday”, “the meeting time agreed 
in an SMS” or “the URL of the website I visited”. 
In addition to these passive data gathering features, there are also a number of in-
credibly useful monitoring applications aimed at keeping our children safe, which 
pro-actively make use of the data collected from Internet monitoring tools, such as 
CheckStick – http://www.checkstick.com, which tells you what your kids are 
looking at online. In most cases, these tools are very valuable to keep their users safe, 
but for survivors of domestic violence, these convenient features and monitoring tools 
 can become an instrument of abuse, in that it allows an abuser to track the survivor’s 
activities even when the abuser is not present, and thereby control/restrict the activi-
ties of the survivor. For example, the abuser can control who the survivor can com-
municate with, monitor what the survivor looks at online, and trace where the survi-
vor travels. All these lead to the intimate partner cyber stalking mentioned earlier. 
The reality for a survivor is that any attempt to seek help, either from friends and 
family or from support organisations, is likely to attract attention and possibly further 
abuse. This has the effect that although technology is providing more convenient 
ways for survivors to access the help they require, it is also preventing survivors from 
accessing those resources. Current Internet browser and mobile phone technologies 
make it relatively easy for an abuser to review the electronic records that the survivors 
have collected; conversely it requires a much greater level of technical knowledge and 
quite a lot of work on the part of the survivors to cover their tracks. 
Therefore the technologies that are designed for our convenience inadvertently put 
survivors at a technological disadvantage. One way to address this problem is by eras-
ing survivor’s electronic footprints, but this is not as straightforward as it sounds. 
Internet browsers and mobile phones will (by default) record their actions, but using a 
“clear all” approach leaves large gaps in the history, which can also raise abuser's 
suspicion. To make matters worse for the survivors, each technology stores data in a 
different way, requiring extra knowledge and effort to effectively remove the traces of 
their activities. In some cases, data such as mobile phones billing records cannot be 
altered by the user, leaving them with very limited or even no options. 
Key Requirements. The proposed system aims to benefit survivors of domestic vio-
lence. These survivors tend to have limited knowledge and experience with technol-
ogy, and in some cases, English is not their first language [17]. As such, the system 
needs to be very easy to use, with minimal interaction required with its users. In fact, 
being invisible is another key requirement, so that the system does not draw attention 
from the survivors’ abuser. Most – if not all – of the technical activities (such as in-
stalling and configuring the proposed system) will be performed by staff at the sup-
port centre, with assistance from the authors/developers of the system. 
Attacker Model. The main potential attackers will be the survivors’ partner (and 
abuser). They have access to or control of the (shared) computer at home or even the 
survivors’ smartphones. They have sufficient computer knowledge (for example, they 
know how to check web browser history), but they are not a hacker or an expert in 
computer security or forensic. They will not monitor the survivors’ computer usage 
all the time (e.g. no key logger or network sniffer will be used). Nonetheless, it is 
expected that the attacker will be able to take control of the survivor’s computer after 
the survivor finishes using it to access domestic violence support websites. Therefore 
one of the main aims of our proposed solutions (see Section 3) is to remove traces of 
digital footprints associated with domestic violence support websites from any de-
vices used by the survivors. 
 1.2 Related Work in Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
Issues related to private browsing are not new, and many papers have addressed them 
to various levels and from different perspectives. Aggarwal et al. [1], considers two 
types of attackers threatening private browsing: local attacker (family member or 
other people who has access to the user’s machine and might be able to examine its 
browser’s history) and web attacker (web sites trying to track and collect data from 
the user’s visit). 
Plenty of research has been done in dealing with web and third-party attackers (for 
example [2][8][20][22]). In our work, however, we are interested in defending against 
local attackers, which include survivors’ abusers in the domestic violence scenario. 
Portable versions of the popular Internet browsers that allow private or incognito 
browsing (e.g. Google Chrome [21]) are available to defend against local attackers. 
There are even more comprehensive solutions such as Tails [23] (which can be de-
ployed as a live USB stick or DVD for preserving anonymity), containing a set of 
online anonymity tools including Tor [24]. 
If used correctly, these solutions represent the most effective way of achieving pri-
vacy. But they rely on the user being technically savvy or even remembering to turn 
on and use these features. This is often not the case with survivors of domestic vio-
lence. Their knowledge of computer technologies, security and privacy is usually very 
limited, so it is unreasonable to expect them to be able to use complex features pro-
vided by these solutions. Moreover, it is not possible to use USB stick or CD/DVD 
when accessing information on a mobile phone. Therefore, these solutions – even 
though they are widely available and provide excellent features for private browsing – 
constitute only one of the layers of protection that we envisage will be necessary for 
achieving privacy for these survivors.  
2 Case Study: Experience with Survivors 
In this paper, we focus on a case study involving survivors who attend a women’s 
support centre for Black and Minority Ethnic (BME), based in the UK (for privacy 
reasons, we do not state the name of this support centre, instead we refer to it as our 
“case study”). Data collection was performed using an online survey through several 
sessions organised by the support centre’s staff, in which, groups of survivors as well 
as women from the control group completed the online survey. 
This case study provides us with important insights and experience in the design 
and development of socio-technical systems where privacy is one of the key features. 
It also allows us to come up with novel ideas on how new technologies can be used 
for ensuring privacy. Some of these ideas are still to be implemented, but we are con-
fident that they will contribute positively in improving users’ privacy, while being 
usable and practical at the same time. We are also planning to carry out evaluation of 
the whole system once it is fully implemented. 
The research shows that survivors have two major barriers to successfully access-
ing the support services that they require [17]: 
 • locating the support services and the organisations that provide them, and 
• fear of provoking further abuse if their abuser discovers that they have been seek-
ing help (hence their reluctance to report the incidents to the police or relatives). 
In effect, survivors are being excluded from the socio-technical systems that the rest 
of us take for granted, largely because they are afraid of using these systems for fear 
of being found out looking for help. This paper proposes a digital strategy for the 
social inclusion of survivors. The strategy incorporates several technology-based 
solutions and a training strategy, which together will help to overcome these barriers. 
The aims are to publicise domestic violence support services in a way that is most 
accessible to survivors, while at the same time providing technological solutions that 
help survivors avoid leaving telltale electronic footprints. 
2.1 Method and Implementation 
The overall aim of this case study is the social inclusion of survivors through technol-
ogy, and to achieve this, the tasks have been divided into a number of sub-goals: 
• Understand how survivors currently relate to technologies that would be useful to 
them and the technological issues that they face 
• Propose a digital strategy to make domestic violence support services more acces-
sible 
• Propose a range of technological solutions that help survivors avoid leaving telltale 
electronic footprints 
In order to address these goals, we have worked closely with the staff at the case 
study’s support centre to understand the technological issues faced by survivors. The 
guidance given by the case study’s staff has been invaluable in the development of the 
technology strategy.  
Due to the sensitive nature of the subject, it was not appropriate to use standard 
user interview techniques to gather the data required. It was felt that an online survey 
would be a less intrusive way to gather the data, as this could be carried out in the 
familiar surroundings of the case study’s facility with the assistance of its staff, with-
out requiring a member of our research team to be present. The women who com-
pleted the survey were selected from women regularly attending services provided by 
the centre. There were two groups of these women: survivors of domestic violence, 
and a control group of women who attend the centre for other activities (not related to 
domestic violence, such as learning English language or new skills). The data were 
collected from the control group to minimise the influence of other factors common to 
all women attending this centre, such as socio-economic and/or ethnic group. 
The survey collected information relating to the following topics: (i) the location of 
the computer the women used to access the internet; (ii) websites visited, including 
any online support services used; (iii) other communications channels such as instant 
messaging; (iv) type and capabilities of mobile phones used; (v) indication of age 
range (to eliminate any age related trends); (vi) whether survivors felt they were being 
monitored; (vii) which support services survivors would like to see implemented. 
 Two online survey forms were used to collect the data, one for survivors and one 
for the control group. The control group were not asked questions specifically relating 
to domestic violence. A multiple-choice format was utilised to obtain the granularity 
required and ensure the uniformity of terminology used in responses. The forms can 
be viewed at: 
http://research.cs.ncl.ac.uk/surveys/survivors-survey.html and 
http://research.cs.ncl.ac.uk/surveys/womens-survey.html. 
There are two competing considerations when deciding which support services would 
best serve the needs of the survivors: 
• preference of the survivors – there is no point providing services which survivors 
do not want or will not use  
• affordability/running costs – it would be counter-productive to create a support 
service for survivors which has to be withdrawn because it is too expensive to run 
Our choices regarding which technologies to use are therefore influenced by these 
factors and we also endeavour to develop a system that is as easy to use as possible. 
2.2 Lessons Learnt 
Our contact with the case study commenced in June 2010, and it has involved close 
collaboration with the staff at the support centre. From this collaboration, we have 
been able to draw insights and initial conclusions about the issues faced by survivors 
and the support services used by survivors [17].  
One of the major challenges that survivors face is that it requires more effort and 
more technical knowledge for them to erase their electronic footprints, than it does for 
their abuser to follow them. It is interesting to notice that survivors seem to be aware 
of the feature of Internet browsers to record the history of the pages they have visited, 
and that survivors are keen to be able to avoid this. Therefore redressing the balance 
in favour of the survivor will require a range of measures including redesigned web-
sites, history cleaning technologies and training. 
Table 1. Technologies usage of survivors. 
Category  Survivors Control 
Access to the Internet 71% 100% 
Access to computer outside the home (friends, relatives, library) 29% 87% 
Used Internet communications such as Skype and IM 43% 87% 
Mobile phone usage / ownership 86% 87% 
 
A survey of survivors was performed as part of the case study, to capture first-hand 
their opinions. A total of 22 women completed the online survey, the results of which 
have provided valuable insights into – among others – the technology usage of survi-
vors. Table 1 provides a summary of the survivors’ usage of technology as compared 
to that of the control group. The survey results show that the survivors in our sample 
are 29% less likely than others in their socio-economic/cultural/ethnic group to be 
 regularly using the Internet and the support services it provides. Encouragingly, the 
survey also shows that mobile phone usage amongst survivors is pretty much equal to 
that of the control group of the sample. Although survivors did not express a strong 
preference for an Internet browser that does not record history, it is felt from our read-
ing of related works mentioned in Section 1 that this will be a valuable tool to imple-
ment for survivors. Further information regarding the survey can be found in [17]. 
3 Proposed Solutions 
Our research proposes a number of technology solutions to improve survivors’ access 
to domestic violence support services. We are also focusing on providing a feature for 
erasing survivors’ digital footprints without raising suspicion to their abusers. 
3.1 More Accessible Domestic Violence Support Services 
There are technologies that can improve the accessibility of support services by ensur-
ing that survivors are not excluded because they do not know that the support service 
is there. These include Quick Response (QR) codes, as well as Near Field Communi-
cation (NFC) and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags. 
 
 
Fig. 1. QR code example containing a single use URL. 
QR codes are printed two-dimensional barcodes (Fig. 1) that can encode a URL or a 
SMS text message and can be read by a smartphone or a laptop with a webcam, al-
lowing easy dissemination of web pages. NFC and RFID tags are a class of wireless 
information storage device that can store much more data than a QR code and can be 
read by some smartphones and computers. 
With smartphones capable of reading QR codes – and even NFC and RFID tags – 
becoming more accessible and readily available for survivors to use, we propose em-
bedding information in real world objects using these technologies. 
Imagine that you are a close friend or family member of a survivor who is still in 
an abusive relationship and you want to help by letting her know about online support 
services which can help, without alerting her partner. What is required is a way of 
hiding the URL in an everyday object that will not arouse suspicion. QR codes can be 
printed on self-adhesive labels, making it easy to attach a URL to any real-world ob-
 ject; this could be a poster or flyer advertising the support service or other everyday 
objects such as a postcard from a friend or on the base of a mug thereby disguising its 
meaning. 
  
 
Fig. 2. Postcard with QR code – front (left) and back (right). 
An example of a QR code embedded in an innocent-looking postcard can be seen 
in Fig. 2. The QR code in Fig. 1 can be read with a smartphone and contains a URL 
which points to a live demo of “single use URL access codes” (see Section 3.2). 
QR codes are very cost effective because free software applications can be used to 
print them, so the only costs are the printing and the sticky labels. This compares very 
favourably with the cost of NFC, currently around £1.50 per item. NFC tags are much 
more expensive than QR codes so their use would be limited to applications where the 
additional functionality they provide is worth the extra expense. NFC objects can 
carry a great deal more information than QR codes, this provides the opportunity to 
embed more data. For example, an NFC tag could be used to store a list of all support 
services in the local area. These tags could then be attached to posters advertising 
support services, and the survivors can download and view the whole list on their 
phone without having to connect to the Internet. NFC tags can also give a unique 
response to each person who accesses the information; this would allow posters to be 
created that will hand out a different single use URL to each smartphone that accesses 
the poster.  
3.2 Erasing the Digital Footprints of Survivors 
Allowing survivors to freely access online resources whilst hiding their activities from 
their abusers is a complex problem that does not have a single solution. Our approach 
consists of a number of complementary technologies that provide layers of protection. 
Single Use URL Access Codes. Given that a survivor may forget (or even not be 
aware of how) to use the private browsing feature, or do not know how to clear their 
history after accessing domestic violence support services online, it is proposed that 
specific sections of domestic violence websites could incorporate an automatic means 
of sanititising the browser history of anyone who visits the website. 
 Our solution hides pages relating to domestic violence support services behind “in-
nocent pages” from a real website that the survivor would quite legitimately use. The 
website is designed with both innocent pages and domestic violence pages, anyone 
entering the website without a valid access key would be given innocent pages only.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Domestic violence support directory page (left) and innocent replacement page (right). 
This example uses content for ESOL (English for Speakers of Other Languages) 
courses as the innocent pages, this matches the profile of the women who use the case 
study’s services, many of whom attend ESOL courses to improve their English. Dif-
ferent centres will use different innocent pages, to match the profile of the women 
attending the different centres. Each access key may only be used once; all subse-
quent attempts to access the domestic violence pages with a used access key will re-
sult in innocent pages being presented (an example can be seen in Fig. 3). This stops 
the abuser from following the browser history to the domestic violence support pages. 
The access codes can be distributed in various ways; the method selected should 
draw the least attention for the survivors who will be using them. Some of the meth-
ods we envisage using include: embedding QR codes on postcards, posters, flyers or 
objects, providing a USB stick containing tools that survivors can use, emailing the 
URL to survivors, printing the URL on tear-off strips at the bottom of a poster, and 
sending the URL as a text message. 
An algorithm will generate access codes based on the date, so that codes will be 
valid for a limited time. The access code algorithm will incorporate a checksum to 
stop random numbers being accepted as valid access codes. 
We have implemented a prototype of this solution. 
 
Location-based Service Advertising. A poster advertising a particular domestic 
violence support service will be placed in a public location (e.g. bus stops, shopping 
malls, local shop windows or in the window of the service provider). The poster al-
lows survivors to access online domestic violence service pages and resources on 
their mobile phone whilst they are at the location of the poster, however once they 
 leave the location, the URL cannot be accessed using the history or back button. This 
feature will be facilitated by the single use URL mechanism (described previously), 
which provides the domestic violence support service the first time the URL is used; 
any subsequent request using the URL code will result in an innocent page being 
displayed. 
Unlike the static Quick Response (QR) codes on postcards/sweets, the poster will 
give a new single use URL each time a user passes their phone close to the poster. A 
programmable Near Field Communication (NFC) smart tag is capable of running a 
small JavaCard program, which will produce a new unique URL for each request. The 
JavaCard program uses an algorithm to calculate the single use URLs, each URL will 
be unique and will conform to the validation routine on the web site providing the 
domestic violence support service.  
We will implement this solution soon. 
Targeted History Sanitisation Agent. The objective of history sanititation agent is 
to automatically erase the digital footprints left behind when a user accesses specific 
support websites, by removing all history entries related to the support websites, in-
cluding temporary Internet files, browser history entries, and cookies. 
The agent will leave intact all other history entries, thereby avoiding making it look 
like the PC has been cleaned. The agent will automatically download a list of support 
websites, which will be used to decide which entries to delete; the list will be updated 
by support centre staff when new support websites go online. 
Smartphones are becoming an increasingly popular way for accessing online con-
tent. We are therefore developing versions of the history sanitisation agent for An-
droid and iPhone platforms as well. The smartphone agent development has also in-
vestigated the ability to automatically cleanse the phone of unwanted entries in the 
call and SMS history lists. Installation of this agent on smartphones will be carried out 
at the support centre. It is a bit trickier to deploy the targeted history sanititation agent 
on the survivors’ computer, which tend to be a shared PC at home that their abuser 
also has access to. We envisage packaging the agent – along with portable anonymous 
browsers and other privacy tools – into a USB stick or a live CD/DVD that can be 
distributed to survivors. Training on how to use these tools will be given to survivors 
by staff at the support centre. 
We have implemented a prototype of this solution for Microsoft Windows based 
PCs supporting various web browsers, as well as for Android smartphones. 
Secret Graphical Gateway. The idea is to design and implement an application that 
will display a set of pictures as the front end of the gateway. When a survivor clicks 
the correct number of points in the right coordinates on the right picture and in the 
right sequence (set-up beforehand), the application will direct them to the support 
services site, otherwise it will do nothing. This way, the application will look innocent 
and will not raise suspicion to the survivor's abuser. In fact, this gateway application 
could be disguised as a digital picture viewer. In a sense, this is comparable to graphi-
 cal password (e.g. [5]), albeit being “invisible” in its nature (without any signposting 
or obvious interactive feature that might attract attention). 
We have implemented a prototype for Android smartphones. 
4 Conclusion and Future Work 
Through this work, we have demonstrated the need for solutions that will have a sig-
nificant impact on social inclusion for survivors of domestic violence by improving 
the accessibility of domestic violence support service and by improving the ability of 
survivors to avoid leaving electronic footprints when they access these services. The 
case study shows that existing technologies utilised by survivors unintentionally work 
contrary to these aims. Given that this situation is unlikely to change and there is a 
limited budget for this project, we have adopted a strategy that proposes a set of bite-
sized solutions, each of which will be relatively quick implement at a modest cost.  
We have implemented and tested the single use URL access codes idea, the tar-
geted history sanititation agent, as well as the secret graphical gateway. However, 
wider deployment and further evaluation of the effectiveness of these solutions are 
still to be carried out. We will complete the implementation of other novel ideas, in-
cluding the location-based domestic violence support advertising proposed in Section 
3.2, either as proof of concept demonstrations or as fully functional solutions soon. 
We plan to continue working with the case study’s staff and survivors, to gather 
additional data and results through questionnaires and “in the wild” deployment of the 
proposed solutions, including their usability assessment. We will also explore other 
potential avenues for effective solution by conducting participatory, experience-
centred design process with the survivors and the staff at the support centre. 
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